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Abstract
Bankruptcy risk is a crucial factor in auditors’
decisions whether or not to modify their audit
opinion based on the going-concern assumption.
SOX required more extensive audit procedures than
those required before its passage. More extensive
audit procedures should result in more meaningful
audit reports. This study examines whether the
auditors’ going-concern opinion provides more
useful incremental information after SOX than
before SOX in distinguishing between distressed
companies that become bankrupt in the next year
and those that do not. We find that an audit opinion
variable adds more useful information to
bankruptcy prediction models after SOX than
1
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before SOX. Our findings provide evidence that
financial statement users have derived benefits from
the costly procedures required under SOX.

INTRODUCTION
A sometimes critical and difficult decision faced by
auditors is whether to modify their audit opinions based on goingconcern assumptions. Properly assessing bankruptcy risk has been
a goal of corporate stakeholders for many years. Auditing
standards, including Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No.
59 (AICPA 1988), contain requirements and guidelines for
auditors. SAS No. 59 requires auditors to evaluate the likelihood
that a company will continue in business for the next year after the
financial statement date. Substantial doubt as to a company
continuing in business requires auditors to include an explanatory
paragraph after the opinion paragraph that describes the goingconcern problem. Including the explanatory paragraph is
commonly referred to issuing a modified "going-concern" opinion.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) imposed many new
requirements on auditing firms including an evaluation of a
company's internal control over financial reporting. A motivation
for SOX was to restore investor confidence in securities and
publicly available financial information. Complying with SOX
required much more extensive audit procedures than were
previously required. The extra audit work would presumably
result in better information provided by auditors.
When considering a going-concern opinion modification,
SAS No. 59 suggests conducting analytical procedures (including
ratio analysis) and reviewing compliance with the terms of loan
and debt agreements. Auditors should evaluate the negative trends
in financial ratios and compliance with loan debt requirements.
Much previous research has examined what conditions or events
lead auditors to modify their opinions due to the going-concern
assumption. However, we know of no studies that examined
whether going-concern modifications' usefulness in explaining
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future bankruptcy significantly improved after SOX compared to
before SOX -- a potential benefit from SOX requirements.
This study examines whether auditors' going-concern
decisions provide more useful incremental information after SOX
than before SOX in explaining companies’ bankrupt status in the
next year. We limited our analyses to information available in
companies' annual financial reports.
Our sample included
information from annual financial reports issued for 1997 to 1999
as our pre-SOX period and for 2002 to 2006 as our post-SOX
period.
We find that auditors' going-concern modification
decisions after SOX added more incremental useful information to
bankruptcy models than before SOX. These results provide
evidence that costly audit procedures required under SOX have
provided benefits to financial statement users. The next section
more fully discusses the motivation for our study and related prior
research. Then, we explain our hypothesis and research methods
and present the results of our analyses. The final section contains
our conclusions and suggestions for future research.

MOTIVATION AND PRIOR RESEARCH
Many market participants view the auditor's report as a
critical component to warn of impending going-concern problems.
Many stakeholders tend to view an "audit failure" only as
situations where clients become bankrupt within the next financial
reporting period, but auditors failed to issue going-concern
opinions to them (Blacconiere and DeFond 1997; and Weil 2001).
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) required much more extensive
audit procedures than were previously required and imposed many
new requirements on auditing firms. Many company executives,
accountants, and others have complained about SOX compliance
costs (Foster et al. 2007; Akers et al. 2003). However, extra audit
work required by SOX could result in the benefit of better
information provided by auditors.
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Recent studies including Geiger et al. (2005) and Myers et
al. (2009) used going-concern modification predictive models to
test the increase in issuance of those modifications after SOX,
rather than assessing whether the incremental impact of goingconcern modifications on bankruptcy prediction models changed
after SOX. In contrast, Shumway (2001), Beaver et al. (2005), and
Agarwal and Taffler (2008) assessed bankruptcy prediction
models, but did not consider auditors' going-concern modifications
in their analyses. Sun (2007) tested the incremental usefulness of
going-concern modifications in bankruptcy prediction, but used
bankruptcy data from 1991 to 2002.

Going-concern Modification Literature
Many prior studies have examined auditors’ going-concern
modification decisions in different contexts including Carcello et
al. (1995), Behn et al. (2001), Weber and Willenborg (2003), and
DeFond et al. (2002). These studies provided evidence that
national (Big N) audit firms modified their audit reports due to the
going-concern assumption more frequently than non-Big N firms.
In contrast, Geiger and Rama (2006) did not find an auditor size
affect on going concern opinions in a simple limited to distressed
companies. Consequently, we include a control variable for
auditor size in our bankruptcy prediction models.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) generated research
in many areas and led to publications in both practitioner and
academic journals. Akers et al. (2003) in The CPA Journal
suggested that publicity of extreme cases such as Enron and
WorldCom have "spurred new laws and regulations, led to
increased costs of audit compliance without delivering any
improvement in the prediction of bankruptcies." A follow-up
article (Bellovary et al. 2006) recommended eliminating the goingconcern modification to the audit opinion.
Academic research has indeed addressed the impact of
SOX on going-concern modification of auditors' opinions. Geiger
et al. (2005) audit opinions for 226 financially stressed firms that
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entered bankruptcy from January 2000 to October 16, 2001 (the
date Enron admitted to accounting errors) and from January 2002
to December 2003. They also examined bankruptcies from 1991
and 1992. Geiger et al.'s (2005) results indicated that auditors
were more likely to issue going-concern modified opinions to
subsequently bankrupt companies in the post-December 2001
period than immediately prior to the Enron scandal and around the
recessionary period of the early 1990s. Geiger et al. (2005) did not
examine going-concern opinions related to companies that did not
later enter bankruptcy.
Myers et al. (2009) modified Geiger et al.'s (2005) model
and also included financially stressed firms that did not become
bankrupt. Myers et al. (2009) focused on whether auditors have
become overly conservative in their issuance of going-concern
modifications in their audit opinions. They examined periods
before and after December 31, 2001 (which proxies for pre- and
post- Sarbanes-Oxley Act). Myers et al. (2009, 17) concluded that
after 2001, non-Big N auditors became significantly more
conservative in their going-concern modification decisions, while
going-concern modification decisions of Big N audit firms
improved for companies that later became bankrupt and those that
remained nonbankrupt.
In a recent study, Feldmann and Read (2010) found that the
proportion of going-concern modifications increased sharply in
2002–2003 compared to 2000–2001. However, going-concern
modifications declined after 2003, eventually to the pre-Enron
level. However, neither Feldman and Read (2010) nor Myers et al.
(2009) examined whether the incremental usefulness of the
auditor's opinion in predicting bankruptcy significantly increased
or decreased after SOX, which is relevant considering the
additional cost of SOX compliance.

Bankruptcy Prediction Literature
Many previous bankruptcy prediction studies have used
logistic regression models (Lau 1987; Chen and Church 1992;
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Hopwood et al. 1994; Ward and Foster 1996; Mutchler et al. 1997;
and Foster et al. 1998). Hopwood et al. (1994) used a sample of
stressed bankrupt and nonbankrupt firms to develop logistic
regression models with seven accounting variables. Distress
research by Chen and Church (1992) and Mutchler et al. (1997)
found debt defaults to be positively associated with the probability
of becoming bankrupt. Consequently, Foster et al. (1998) used
Hopwood et al.’s (1994) seven accounting variables and loan
default variables to predict bankruptcy and test the incremental
value of auditors’ going-concern modifications beyond information
previously available to the public.
Foster et al.’s (1998) results indicated that debt defaults
significantly explained future bankruptcy. They also found that
loan default and covenant violations may moderate the impact of
going-concern modifications in explaining bankruptcy; goingconcern modifications were not useful beyond the other variables
included in their model for explaining bankruptcy. Foster et al.
(1998) concluded that debt defaults were one of the most useful
indicators of bankruptcy risk.

Extensions of Previous Research
Our study extends previous audit policy research by
examining whether the incremental usefulness of going-concern
modifications in explaining bankruptcy has improved due to SOX.
As control variables, we include the variables used by Foster et al.
(1998) in our explanatory models. We also added an audit firm
variable to control for potential auditor size effects. Recent
bankruptcy prediction studies have not included loan default and
auditor size variables in their analyses.
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HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH METHODS

Hypothesis
A main impetus for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was
financial fraud perpetrated by publicly traded companies and
associated "audit failures". (See Akers et al. 2003, for example.)
In light of increased pressure/expectations on auditors, Geiger et
al. (2005) and Myers et al. (2009) found that auditors increased the
issuance of going-concern modifications after SOX. Thus, based
on prior research and justifications for passing SOX, we
hypothesize that:
H1: Auditors’ going-concern modification decisions
add more incremental explanatory power to
bankruptcy models after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
than before the Act.

Sample Selection
Because auditors do not consider issuing going-concern
opinions unless a firm is under some financial stress, we only
include stressed firms in our sample. Even among stressed firms,
an auditor's going-concern opinion can reduce the surprise effect
caused by bankruptcy announcements (Chen and Church 1996; and
Holder-Webb and Wilkins 2000). We use measures of financial
stress from previous research (Kida 1980; Mutchler 1985;
Hopwood et al. 1994; Mutchler et al. 1997; and Foster et al. 1998).
To be included in our sample, companies must meet one of the
following criteria: (1) working capital is negative in the current
year, (2) a loss from operations in one of the three years prior to
the event year, (3) negative retained earnings three years before the
event year, or (4) a bottom line loss in one of the last three years
before the event year.
To obtain data from comparable periods of economic
activity, we include companies that experienced bankruptcy from
1998 to 2000 (report years 1997 to 1999) in our pre SOX data and
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companies that experienced bankruptcy from 2003 to 2007 (report
years 2002 to 2006) in our post SOX data. Using 2003
bankruptcies as our earliest post SOX year allows us to use 2002
financial statement information. Table 1 summarizes the process
followed to obtain our sample.

Statistical Analyses and Variables
To statistically test whether audit opinion modifications are
more significantly associated with bankruptcy after SOX than
before SOX while controlling for other factors, we generated
logistic regression models. Logistic regression has been used
extensively in research with categorical dependent variables (See
Foster et al. 1998, for example)
Our dependent variable was a dichotomous measure
relating to bankruptcy:
BANKRUPT = 0 if the stressed company did not
experience
bankruptcy,
and
1 if the stressed company did
experience bankruptcy.
The following independent control variables are based on
Foster et al. (1998). The only difference is that we include a
variable to control for auditor size effects because earlier research
found that the national audit firms modified their audit reports due
to the going-concern assumption more than non-national firm
(Carcello et al. 1995; Behn et al. 2001; Defond et al. 2002; and
Weber and Willenborg 2003).
NITA
= net income/total assets;
CASALES = current assets/sales;
CACL
= current assets/current liabilities;
CATA
= current assets/total assets;
CASHTA = cash/total assets;
LTDTA
= long-term debt/total assets;
LSALES = log (sales);
AUDITOR = 1 if auditor was from one of the Big
N audit firms and 0 otherwise;
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= 0 if firm did not violate a loan
covenant, 1 if the 10-K or annual
report the year before the event year
indicated firm violated terms of
covenant but did not miss a payment
or obtain a favorable debt
accommodation; and
LD
= 0
if
firm
did
not
loan
default/accommodate, 1 if the 10-K
or annual report the year before the
event year indicated firm missed a
payment or obtained a favorable debt
accommodation (missed payments,
received an extension, favorable debt
restructuring, etc.).
Data needed to construct the auditor variable and
accounting-based variables were obtained from the COMPUSTAT
North American Industrial Annual database for the last annual
financial statements issued prior to bankruptcy.
The main variable of interest in this study is the interaction
between audit opinion and pre- or post-SOX. Thus, the following
two variables and their interaction were tested:
OPIN
= 0 if company received an
auditor’s opinion unmodified
due to the going-concern
assumption, and 1 if received an
opinion modified due to the
going-concern assumption; and
SOX_PERIOD = 0 if the data is from the period
before Sarbanes-Oxley, and 1 if
the data is after Sarbanes-Oxley.
The interaction between audit opinion and SOX (OPIN
*SOX_PERIOD) is the variable of interest in this study. A
significant, positive parameter estimate for OPIN *SOX_PERIOD,
would indicate that auditors’ going-concern modification decisions
more accurately reflect companies' future bankruptcy status after
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Sarbanes-Oxley than before the Act, thus accepting this study’s
hypothesis.

RESULTS FROM ANALYSES

Logistic Regression Models
Table 2 reports results from the logistic regression models
with interaction terms. The first model was run on the full data for
the years identified in Table 1. Feldmann and Read (2010) found
that the proportion of going-concern modifications increased
sharply immediately after SOX, but eventually declined to preSOX levels. Consequently, we also report results produced by the
model with the post-SOX observations from 2003 and 2004
deleted.
Table 2 shows that the models’ results for the control
variables are generally consistent with those reported by Foster et
al. (1998). Similar to Foster et al., our results suggest that both
COVVIO and LD are significantly and positively associated with
bankruptcy; bankrupt firms are more likely to have loan covenant
violations and/or loan defaults/accommodations than nonbankrupt
firms one year before the event. Other significant control variables
(at p-value < .05) in our bankruptcy model are NITA, CATA,
LTDTA, LSALES, and SOX_PERIOD. CATA, LTDTA, and
LSALES were not significant in the Foster et al. (1998) article, but
are significant here. Similar to Geiger and Rama (2006) we did
not find a national auditor relationship with distress; the
AUDITOR variable is not significant. The significant negative
parameter estimate for SOX_PERIOD indicates that stressed
companies were less likely to enter bankruptcy after SarbanesOxley than before. Based on the sample proportions reported
earlier, this result is as expected.
The interaction term OPIN*SOX_PERIOD tests our
hypothesis that the positive relationship between audit opinion and
bankruptcy is stronger in the post SOX period. The parameter
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estimates for OPIN*SOX_PERIOD are positive and significant (at
p-values < .05) as expected in analyses with all observations, and
the analysis omitting 2003 and 2004 bankruptcies. The positive
parameter estimates suggest that auditors are significantly more
likely to issue going-concern modifications to future stressed
bankrupt firms after SOX than before SOX; auditors distinguished
significantly better one year in advance which stressed companies
would and would not, go bankrupt post-SOX than they did before
SOX. Thus, results for the analyses with observations including
both the pre-SOX and post-SOX period` are consistent with our
hypothesis; auditors’ going-concern modification decisions added
significantly more incremental explanatory power to the
bankruptcy model after SOX than before the Act. H1 is accepted.

Models by Period
Results for this study did differ somewhat from those
reported by Foster et al. (1998). The significant positive sign on
the parameter estimate for OPIN reported in Table 2 suggests that
auditors’ going concern opinions were incrementally useful in
explaining subsequent bankruptcy even after controlling for loan
defaults/accommodations. This result is not consistent with Foster
et al. (1998). However, Foster et al.'s sample obviously contained
all pre-SOX observations.
The significance on OPIN may result from our sample
containing post SOX data.
Our results for the
OPIN*SOX_PERIOD interaction suggests that OPIN is more
strongly associated with bankruptcy after SOX than before SOX.
The strength of this relationship after SOX may be strong enough
to render the variable significant even when pre-SOX data is
included in the sample. Consequently, we ran separate regression
analyses on the pre SOX data (from 1998 to 2000, 374
observations) and the post-SOX data (from 2003 to 2007, 589
observations). We also looked at only using data from 2005 to
2007 for the post SOX model. Because the results for this model
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were similar to analyses with 2003 to 2007 data, we only report
results for analyses with the 2003 to 2007 firms.
These models by period results are reported in Table 3.
Because the models are run within each period, the SOX_PEROD
variable and related interactions are no longer relevant. Only the
LD*OPIN interaction is still relevant.
Results show that OPIN is very significant after SOX (pvalue < .001), but not significant before SOX (p-value not < .05).
These analyses reinforce results reported in Table 2. The
OPIN*SOX_PERIOD interaction term in Table 2 and the pre-SOX
period result for OPIN reported in Table 3 are consistent with the
results of Foster et al. (1998). Thus, statistical results suggest that
SOX requirements did lead auditors to issue more useful going
concern modifications.
Therefore, auditors going-concern
modifications should help users of financial statements to better
predict future bankruptcy among stressed companies.

CONCLUSION
This study extends prior audit research by testing whether
the association between going-concern modifications and future
bankruptcy significantly improved after SOX. We incorporate
control variables used in an earlier audit study (Foster et al. 1998)
and added a control variable for audit firm size. We used logistic
regression models to test the relationship between going concern
modifications and future bankruptcy before and after SOX.
Our analyses provide evidence that auditors' going-concern
modification decisions added significantly more incremental useful
information in explaining future bankruptcy after SOX than before
SOX. Thus, our results suggest that the auditors were not
necessarily just more conservative in their audit opinion
modifications after SOX, but they better anticipated future
bankruptcy of stressed companies. These analyses support the
contention that costly audit procedures required under SOX have
provided benefits to financial statement users in the form of more
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accurate going-concern modifications. These benefits should be
considered in future deliberations of repealing or changing any
SOX requirements for auditors.
Unlike some recent bankruptcy prediction studies, (Sun
2007; Beaver et al. 2005; and Shumway 2001) we included only
one year lagged data in our models and decided to not employ a
hazard model with several years of data. We decided to employ
more traditional one year lagged logistic regression models for a
couple of reasons.
First, this study followed the goingconcern/bankruptcy research of Foster et al. (1998). Thus, the
same sampling and statistical techniques were used so that any
differences found in this study could be attributed to the variable of
interest and not be confounded by differing sampling and statistical
techniques. Also, only one lagged year was possible to obtain a
sample for the post-SOX period.
Second, loan covenant violation and loan default variables
were needed because prior research has shown that both are
significant in explaining future bankruptcy (Chen and Church
1992; Mutchler et al. 1997; and Foster et al. 1998) and that loan
defaults may moderate the usefulness of going concern
modifications in explaining future bankruptcy (Foster et al. 1998).
However, including loan covenant violation and loan default
variables physically limits the number of companies that can be
included in a sample because loan default information must be
determined by manually examining footnotes to annual financial
statements. Addressing the incremental benefit of the goingconcern modification with a larger sample and use of a hazard
model would provide an extension to the research conducted in this
study.
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Table 1

Sample Selection
Bankrupt

Post SOX

Identified from bankruptcy.com, Wall Street Journal Index, Lexis-Nexis, or
Westlaw Business/LIVEDGAR
Company in inappropriate SIC or not included in COMPUSTAT
Insufficient information in COMPUSTAT or were unable to check other
information in EDGAR
Bankrupt Companies with all variables (used in regression models)
Nonbankrupt

527
(251)
276

420
(183)
237

(93)
183

(102)
135

Post SOX

Initially identified as potential match
Insufficient information in COMPUSTAT or were unable to check other
information in EDGAR
Nonbankrupt Companies with all variables (used in regression models)
Totals of final sample

Pre SOX

Totals

318

Pre SOX

643

488

(237)
406

(249)
239

645

589

374

963

Table 2
Logistic Regression Results
Model with 2003 and
Model Using Full Data 2004 firms dropped
Parameter
Parameter
2
Variables
Estimates
Estimates Wald 2
Wald 
Intercept
-2.97
35.80***
-0.60
1.16
NITA
-0.52
5.40*
-0.55
2.75
CASALES
-0.01
1.36
-0.01
1.06
CACL
-0.20
3.47
-0.18
2.28
CATA
1.10
5.57*
1.42
6.63**
CASHTA
-0.87
1.01
-2.46
4.75*
LTDTA
1.44
19.72***
1.27 11.90***
LSALES
0.41
7.21**
0.38
4.60*
AUDITOR
0.18
0.40
0.25
0.54
COVVIO
1.10
25.72***
0.42 11.15***
LD
0.88
8.76**
0.81 14.35***
OPIN
1.76
14.18***
1.01 21.07***
SOX_PERIOD
-0.69
9.02**
-0.12
0.36
LD*SOX_PERIOD
-0.20
0.3
-0.16
0.66
LD*OPIN
-0.38
1.08
-0.25
1.52
OPIN*SOX_PERIOD
1.27
4.75*
0.43
4.26*
LD*OPIN*SOX_PERIOD -0.17
0.15
-0.20
0.21
Model -2Log Likelihood

350.75*** (16df)

237.85*** (16df)

All independent variables and relevant interactions were regressed on a
dichotomous nonbankrupt versus bankrupt dependent variable (BANKRUPT).
All of the above variables were defined on pages 7 and 8.
The Wald 2 (1 degree of freedom) tests the significance of each individual
variable, while the -2Log Likelihood tests the predictive significance of the
overall model.
***
**
Significant at p-value < .001.
Significant
at
p-value
<
.01.
*Significant at p-value < .05.
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Table 3
Logistic Regression Results by Period

Variables
Intercept
NITA
CASALES
CACL
CATA
CASHTA
LTDTA
LSALES
AUDITOR
COVVIO
LD
OPIN
LD*OPIN

Panel B: Model on
Data before SOX Period
Parameter
Estimates
Wald 2
-0.822
-1.199
-0.038
-0.070
1.106
-1.937
0.866
0.471
0.027
0.347
0.948
0.549
0.328

Model -2Log Likelihood

1.58
5.18*
0.07
0.25
2.81
1.76
3.74*
4.73*
0.01
5.16**
10.39**
3.44
1.30

Panel B: Model on
Data after SOX Period
Parameter
Estimates
Wald 2
-4.043
-0.411
-0.010
-0.300
0.826
0.314
2.014
0.475
0.175
1.487
2.264
3.213
-1.711

115.659*** (12df)

***
Significant at p-value < .001.
*Significant at p-value < .05.

**
Significant

25.86***
2.69
1.51
3.36
1.49
0.06
17.11***
4.32*
0.22
21.08***
12.27***
48.02***
4.83*

243.264*** (12df)
at

p-value

<

.01.

